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 ABSTRACT 
 
Statutory definitions of what constitutes an “insider” for the purposes of insider trading laws may 
be based on either a “person connection” approach or an “information connection” approach. 
The “person connection” approach defines “insider” by reference to the relationship of the 
person to the public issuer of securities, while the “information connection” approach considers 
anyone who has material price-sensitive information about the issuer to be an insider, 
regardless of his or her relationship to the issuer. 
 
In common with Japan, Hong Kong and China, New Zealand’s insider trading law — the 
Securities Markets Act 1988 — uses a person connection approach in its definition of “insider”. 
Other jurisdictions, however, including both the United Kingdom and Australia, have, to varying 
degrees, recently amended their definitions to reflect the information connection approach. The 
United States, although the first country to address the issue of insider trading, lacks a statutory 
definition of “insider” and instead relies on generally applicable laws against securities fraud. It 
has developed a definition with elements of both approaches. 
 
This paper reviews the definitions in use in the United States and in other countries (including 
New Zealand) which have been influenced by the American experience. It concludes that the 
narrow, relationship-based approach does not capture some conduct that may be damaging to 
the integrity of the securities market. A definition based on the information connection approach 
(perhaps combined with elements of the person connection approach) may therefore be 
preferable to New Zealand’s current definition. 
 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
New Zealand acquired a statutory prohibition against insider trading in 1988 with the enactment 
of Part I of the Securities Markets Act 19881. However, the experience since the Securities 
Markets Act 1988 came into effect is that little action has been taken against insider trading and 
no one has been successfully held liable for insider trading in New Zealand. Public comment 
has suggested that the current insider trading regime does not capture the type of behavior that 
is perceived by the public to be insider trading and that a first principles review of our law is 
necessary.2 As a fundamental part of the insider trading regime, the definition of “insider” is no 
doubt worthy of a review. 
 
The Securities Markets Act 1988 adopts a “person connection” approach in defining “insider”, 
whereby an insider is defined to include anyone who holds material price-sensitive information 
that is not generally available, and who has certain relationships with the public issuer.3 This 
may be contrasted with the “information connection” approach, under which anyone who has 
material price-sensitive information that is not generally available is considered an insider, 
regardless of his or her relationship to the source of the information. 4 It has been suggested 
that there are two main issues to consider when formulating a definition of “insider”: 
 
Should the definition include a “person connection” and/or “information connection” 
approach?; and 
Should the definition of “insider” be limited to a natural person or extended to include 
other entities?5 
 
This paper focuses on the first issue, by way of considering other jurisdictions, to review the 
definition of “insider”. It is worth mentioning here that the Securities Markets Amendment Act 
2002 does not make any amendments to sec 3 of the Securities Markets Act. However, as 
different provisions of an Act interact and reinforce each other, we will give suitable attention to 
the amendments introduced by the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002 when reviewing 
the definition of “insider”. 
 
                                                 
1 In terms of sec 4 of the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002, with effect from 1 December 2002, the 
name of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 has been changed to the Securities Markets Act 1988. 
2 Reform of Securities Trading Law: Volume One: Insider Trading: Fundamental Review. Discussion 
Document, Ministry of Economic Development (May 2002) [3]. In addition, the Ministry of Economic 
Development has also released other discussion documents on the reform of securities trading law: 
Volume Two: Market Manipulation Law and Volume Three: Penalties, Remedies and the Application of 
Securities Trading Law. 
3 Securities Markets Act 1988, sec 3(1). 
4 See, for example, Corporations Act 2001(Cth), sec 1043A(1). 
5 Reform of Securities Trading Law: Volume One: Insider Trading: Fundamental Review. Discussion 
Document, Ministry of Economic Development (May 2002) [109]. 
2 
THE DEFINITION OF “INSIDER” IN THE UNITED STATES: A BACKGROUND 
 
Laws dealing  with insider trading in the United States (US) have been in force for a number of 
years, and insider trading has been described as “the representative white-collar crime of the 
1980s”.6 The US was the first country to tackle insider trading effectively. To some extent the 
law of insider trading in the US reflects and has influenced the development of the definition of 
“insider” in other jurisdictions.7 
 
Prior to legislation specifically prohibiting insider trading, actions for insider trading in the US 
were based on the common law action for fraudulent transactions. In Strong v Repide,8 the US 
Supreme Court enunciated the so-called “special circumstances” doctrine, 9 which was based 
on the existence of a relationship between director and stockholder that is different from the 
relationship between arm’s-length traders. In this case, a controlling stockholder and general 
manager of a corporation purchased the holdings of a minority stockholder without disclosure 
of the then current status of negotiations for the sale of corporate assets. The “special 
circumstances” were found in the fact that the defendant had been entrusted with the 
negotiations to sell the corporate assets; if he had not been a director he would not have had 
an affirmative duty to make disclosure. 10 Thus, under this doctrine directors and officers may, in 
particular circumstances, owe a fiduciary duty to individual shareholders. 
                                                 
6 Elizabeth Szockyj, The Law and Insider Trading: In Search of A Level Playing Field  (1993) 1. 
7 Michael Ashe and Lynne Counsell  note that, while only a few countries have adopted the US approach 
to the law in this field, the fact that the US has a law on insider trading and has adopted, since the early 
1960s, a fairly aggressive stance in enforcing it has influenced most other countries to enact laws on 
insider trading. (Michael Ashe and Lynne Counsell, Insider Trading (2nd ed, 1993) 27.) This is particularly 
true with regard to the New Zealand law. It has been submitted, “New Zealand’s proscription of insider 
trading, tipping and tippee trading bear a strong resemblance to America’s definition of these concepts. 
The American experience can, therefore, serve as useful reference point for possible tensions to be 
encountered in New Zealand’s regulation of these abuses.” (James D. Cox, ‘An Economic Perspective 
of Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement In New Zealand’ (1990) 4 Canterbury Law Review 268, 
277.) 
8 213 US 419,431 (1909). 
9 Apart from the “special circumstances” doctrine, there are also two common law rules: the “majority” or 
“strict” rule and the “minority” or “fiduciary” rule. Under the former, directors and officers owe a fiduciary 
duty only to the corporation; in contrast, the latter holds that directors and officers have a fiduciary duty 
to disclose all material facts when dealing with a shareholder, regardless of whether there are special 
circumstances. Most US jurisdictions take an in-between position, namely the “special circumstances” 
doctrine. (See Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation  (1983) 818-819.) However, whatever 
the facts were, the above common law rules did not apply to transactions between insiders and 
someone who was not a shareholder.  
10 Ibid 819. When granting rescission of the sale of stock, the Supreme Court held, “that the defendant was 
a director of the corporation is but one of the facts upon which the liability is asserted, the existence of 
all the others in addition making such a combination as rendered it the plain duty of the defendant to 
speak.” (Above n 8 at 431.) 
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The seeds of insider trading regulation were planted with the enactment of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter the 1934 Act),11 which was a product of the so-called “New 
Deal” after the stock market crash of 1929. Under sec 16 of the 1934 Act, a limited category of 
insiders must report their transactions in the securities of their companies together with any 
profit gained by them from within a six-month period. The insiders to whom this provision 
applies are officers or directors of companies with a class of equity securities registered under 
the 1934 Act and beneficial owners of 10 per cent or more of such securities.  
 
While sec 10(b) of the 1934 Act was not originally designed to prosecute insider trading, Rule 
10b-5 made in 1942 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under sec 10(b) has 
been of prime importance in the development of insider trading law. Rule 10b-5 is a provision 
which prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in relation to the purchase and 
sale of securities on stock markets.12 Accordingly, the Rule itself makes no specific reference to 
insider trading, let alone giving a definition of insider. However, the lack of a clear legislative 
definition allows the SEC to construct its own interpretations of what is “insider trading”, subject 
to judicial scrutiny.13 Thus, the definition of what insider trading is and who is an insider has 
evolved from administrative agency and court decisions.14 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, due to the widely perceived connection between securities trading and political corruption, 
in 1779 when considering a Bill to establish a Treasury Department, the First US Congress added the 
ban on speculating to the Bill. According to the resulting Act, officials and clerks who violated any of its 
provisions  were to “be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor”, were to pay a $3,000 fine ($500 in the 
clerk’s case), and were to be removed from office and banned from holding any federal office in the 
future. Half of the fine could go to a person who provided the government with information leading to a 
conviction. Although there have been no reported cases of anyone ever having been prosecuted under 
the Act over two centuries, Stuart Banner argues that the passage of the Act incorporated the first 
prohibition in English or US law of what would much later (and normally with reference to corporate 
stock rather than the public debt) come to be called insider trading. (Stuart Banner, Anglo-American 
Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political Roots, 1690-1860  (1998) 161-164.) 
12 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5 (1942) reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mail or any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person,  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.  
13 The SEC, as an “independent” agency, exercises not only executive but also quasi-legislative 
(rulemaking) and quasi-judicial powers under a total of seven related but separate statutes. The first six 
were enacted between 1933 and 1940; the seventh in 1970. (See Loss, above n 9, 39.) 
14 Szockyj, above n 6, 3. 
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Two early judicial pronouncements on Rule 10b-5 came in Kardon v National Gypsum Co.15 
and Speed v Transamerica Corp.16 In both cases, traditional insiders, such as directors, officers 
and majority shareholders, were found guilty of breaching Rule 10b-5 in situations involving 
face-to-face transactions rather than those taking place through impersonal exchanges. 
Because of their special position, traditional insiders have access to confidential corporate 
information and a trust or obligation to refrain from abusing their role for personal financial gain 
has been customary. 
 
In 1961, the SEC extended the reach of the regulation of insider trading on the basis of the 
decision in Re Cady, Roberts and Co.,17 which moved the definition beyond normal fiduciary 
duty. In this case, the defendant Robert Gintel was a broker and partner of Cady, Roberts and 
Co., and Cowdin was a director of Curtiss-Wright Corp and an associate at Cady, Roberts. 
Gintel received inside information about Curtiss-Wright’s dividend from Cowdin and used that 
information to sell Curtiss-Wright stock. Unlike the previous cases, the trades took place on an 
exchange rather than through direct contract with the purchasers. However, in concluding that 
Gintel had violated Rule 10b-5, the SEC extended the duty to disclose to individuals who were 
not previous shareholders (ie. sellers), but rather were purchasers of the stock. In addition, this 
case established that individuals who are outside the corporate organisation could also be 
found guilty of insider trading if they have a “special relationship” with the company. 18  
 
The Cady Roberts decision was subsequently applied in SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 19 In this 
case, the appellate court held that simple possession of material inside information was 
sufficient to evoke the “disclose or abstain” doctrine and, more importantly, it emphasized that 
the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an 
“insider”. Thus, the reach of Rule 10b-5 extended to individuals who, because of special 
connections to the corporation, are privy to confidential information, thereby becoming 
“temporary insiders ”, for example, lawyers, brokers and accountants.20 
 
The US Supreme Court first examined the matter of insider trading in Chiarella v United 
                                                 
15 73 F Supp 798 (ED Pa, 1947). 
16 99 F Supp 808 (D Del, 1951) 
17 40 SEC 907 (1961). The fundamental theory of insider trading liability, the “disclose or abstain” theory, 
was first initiated in this case. According to this theory, anyone who is in possession of material 
nonpublic information should either disclose it to the investing public before trading or abstain from 
trading. 
18 In this respect, the SEC emphasized that the duty arose from two principal elements: (i) The existence 
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to inside information intended to be available only 
for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that 
information by trading without disclosure. (Ibid at 912.) 
19 401 F 2d 833 (2d Cir 1968). 
20 Szockyj, above n 6, 42. 
5 
States.21  The Chiarella case concerned a print worker who traded on material nonpublic 
information about takeover bids. He obtained this information from the announcements that he 
helped to print. The court ordered his acquittal because he did not owe a fiduciary duty to the 
vendor shareholders of the target companies in the takeover bids. That is, to impose the 
“disclose or abstain” doctrine, the trader must be a fiduciary to the firm and consequently to its 
shareholders. Thus the Chiarella case in fact limits the application of the “disclose or abstain” 
theory to only registered insiders. 
 
The question was raised as to the liability of a tippee if the tip is received from an individual 
who is a fiduciary. Soon after Chiarella, the Supreme Court reviewed this issue in Dirks v SEC22 
in which the court established that in order to impose liability on a tippee, the tipper must be a 
fiduciary and the tip has to result in personal profit for the tipper. As there were no personal 
gains in the Dirks case, the court reversed the earlier ruling that the tippee was liable. 
Subsequently the definition of personal gains was broadened to include not only explicit 
personal financial gains but also subjective gains such as gains to one’s reputation, and 
gaining a “warm glow” from providing information to a friend.23 More significantly, the Supreme 
Court in the Dirks case stated that included within the scope of Chiarella’s definition of insider 
are those who have but a temporary relationship with the firm, provided that relationship is 
under circumstances that provide the “temporary insider” with access to confidential corporate 
information. 24  Thus, the Supreme Court revoked the limitation of the Chiarella case and 
broadened the definition of an insider. 
 
With the Supreme Court limiting the application of sec 10(b), the SEC, federal prosecutors and 
the lower courts began to apply the misappropriation theory,25 which broadened the duty owed 
solely to shareholders to include the trader’s employer or clients. The theory was developed in 
Carpenter v United States, in which R. Foster Winans, a writer for the Wall Street Journal daily 
column “Heard on the street” had disclosed the content of his forthcoming articles to a broker 
who traded based on that information and provided a “kickback” to Winans. The Carpenter 
case did not involve the passing of confidential securities information. The information was 
based on an analysis of publicly available knowledge, as opposed to confidential corporate 
knowledge. However, since Winans was an employee of the Wall Street Journal, the 
information he had produced was the property of the Journal. Therefore, by using the 
                                                 
21 445 US 222 (1980). 
22 463 US 646 (1983). 
23 Nasser Arshadi and Thomas H. Eyssell, The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading: Theory and 
Evidence (1993) 52-53. 
24 Above n 22, 655. 
25 The misappropriation theory relies on the principle that all information generated by or through the 
company belongs to the company. Thus, persons who come into possession of such information in 
circumstances that warrant confidentiality are not permitted to misappropriate the information for their 
personal gains or benefits. 
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information for his personal gain he violated his fiduciary duty toward his employer.26 It is worth 
noting that in this case the Supreme Court affirmed the mail and wire fraud conviction, but it 
was divided 4-4 over whether Winans had committed securities fraud.27 By contrast, although 
not in legislation, the US Congress has expressed its approval of the misappropriation theory 
as validly falling within the bounds of sec 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 28 
 
The application of the misappropriation theory has been further clarified in a more recent case, 
United States v O’Hagan,29 in which the Supreme Court had to decide whether it was unlawful 
for defendants, who have no relationship to the corporation in whose shares they trade, to 
purchase or sell while in possession of information acquired from another person with whom 
they have a fiduciary relationship. The O’Hagan case retains the requirement of a fiduciary 
relationship between the defendant and the party from which the information is misappropriated. 
That is, if there is no fiduciary relationship between the source of the information and the 
defendant, there is no wrongful misappropriation. 30  The misappropriation theory seems to 
represent the current position in the US, and has been used in scenarios beyond employment 
relationships.31 
 
From the evolution of insider trading law in the US described above,32 there are three points 
worth noting: 
 
First, there is a trend to broaden the definition of what insider trading is and who is an insider. 
With the evolution of insider trading, liability for insider trading has been extended from the 
common law doctrine of fraud in a personal stock transaction between two parties to trades 
which occur on an impersonal stock exchange. Likewise, instead of only corporate directors, 
                                                 
26 In a strong dissent to the majority decision of the Court of Appeals, Miner J believed that this was not a 
securities -related issue and the majority was erroneous in its application of the misappropriation theory: 
see United States v Carpenter 791 F 2d 1024 (2d Cir 1986). This question is discussed further below. 
27 484 US 19, 24 (1987). The judgment, delivered by White J, records simply that “the court is evenly 
divided with respect to the convictions under the securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment 
below on those counts”. No explanation is given as to how the nine-member court came to be evenly 
divided. 
28 Szockyj, above n 6, 50-51. 
29 117 S Ct 2199 (1997). It is argued that the Supreme Court in this case has “completed the regulatory 
quilt for insider trading regulation”. (Ross Buckley, ‘United States v O’Hagan: completing the insider 
trading mosaic’ (1998) 72 Australian Law Review 412, 412). 
30 See United States v Chestman 946 F 2d 551 (2d Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1759 (1992). 
31 Lori Semaan, Mark A Freeman and Michael A Adams, ‘Is Insider Trading a Necessary Evil for Efficient 
Markets?: An International Comparative Analysis’ (1999) 17 Company and Securities Law Journal 220, 
222. 
32 The above discussion is not the whole story of insider trading law in the US. For the present purposes, 
we will not deal with insider trading liabilities arising under other statutes such as Rule 14e-b , the Mail 
and Wire Fraud Statutes, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act. 
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officers and majority shareholders who owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders, insiders may now 
include employees of the company, individuals with temporary access to confidential corporate 
information and tippees. 33 Although the law involving “outside-insiders” remains unclear, it 
seems that the definition of insider has been extended to catch anyone who trades on 
nonpublic information. 
 
Secondly, the misappropriation theory has become one of the most effective tools in the 
enforcement of the insider trading law. In one sense, anyone who trades on nonpublic 
information could be caught by the misappropriation theory. After all, every insider trading case 
involves an unauthorised use of confidential information. That is, misappropriation could occur 
in all insider trading cases, whether the defendant is the classic insider that is embraced in 
Chiarella, or the outsider whose fiduciary relationship with one company provides valuable 
information about a company with whom the defendant has no relationship.34  
 
However, this is not to say that the misappropriation theory is not without limitation. 35 In some 
cases such as Carpenter, whether or not the misappropriation theory is applicable is still open 
to question. In this respect, it has been submitted that misappropriation is present only when 
there is a secretive breach of an expectation of loyalty. This means two things: first, employers 
and other sources can presumably authorise insider trading if they so desire; second, if the 
trader tells the source in advance of his intent to trade, there can be no secretive breach.36 To 
justify the prohibition against insider trading as such, Professor James Cox has argued: 
 
There is a grave danger that such a privatised view of insider trading will ultimately 
cause our present concern for preserving the integrity of fair and efficient capital 
markets to be subordinated to the vagaries of private arrangements between the 
defendant and his employer. Just as the successful prosecution of Mr Winans should 
not have been scuttled if his employers, Dow Jones and Co., has licensed him to trade 
on the advance knowledge of companies touted in his column, the proscription of 
trading which poses a threat to the fairness and efficiency of capital markets should not 
be subordinated to private arrangements between an employer and his employees. 37 
 
It seems that under the misappropriation theory, at least as far as the American insider trading 
regime is concerned, the underlying policy has shifted to the rationales of market fairness and 
efficiency. In this sense, the American approach has elements of the “information connection” 
                                                 
33 Szockyj, above n 6, 54. 
34 Buckley, above n 29, 416. 
35 For example see Alcock’s discussion on this issue. (Alistair Alcock, ‘Order Restored to US Insider-
dealing Law’ (1997) 18 Company Lawyer 301, 303.) 
36 James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman and Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases and 
Materials (3rd ed, 2001) 966-967. 
37 Ibid. 
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approach; to some extent we could say that the definition of “insider” under the US law is based 
on a person connection approach, but includes an information connection. After all, if we apply 
the notion that an insider is someone who has a relationship with the issuer of the securities, 
then a person such as Winans would be unlikely to be regarded as an insider except where 
there is a business relationship between the newspaper and the company about which the 
journalist obtained unpublished information.38 
 
However, the American approach does require a fiduciary relationship between the insider and 
the source of the inside information. Although in Carpenter Winans had no a fiduciary link with 
the issuer, he did with his employer, whose property the inside information was considered to 
be. Under the misappropriation theory, a fiduciary relationship might be established through 
any position of trust and confidence and the definition of insider might cover any outsiders who 
trade on nonpublic information, but due to the requirement of a fiduciary link between the 
insider and the source of information, the practical effect of the misappropriation theory is 
narrower than the information connection approach. For example, a taxi driver who overhears 
passengers discussing a sensitive corporate matter would be unlikely to be caught by the 
misappropriation theory.  
 
Thirdly, lacking a legislative definition of insider trading and “insider”, 39 the SEC could, and still 
can, test the boundaries to determine how far it may push the parameters, subject to judicial 
scrutiny. Although it has been argued that the SEC has overstepped its power in its 
interpretation of the current law, the US Congress and the courts usually leave in the hands of 
the SEC the ability to define what it believes insider trading to involve.40 In fact, the SEC has an 
important role in regulating insider-trading activities and enforcing the insider trading law. Since 
the SEC has a closer relationship with the securities market and can quickly react to the newest 
developments in insider trading, this regime could widen or narrow the scope of the regulation 
through the SEC’s interpretation subject to judicial review. On the other hand, to some extent 
                                                 
38 Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett, Company and Securities Law: Commentary and Materials (2002) 
960. 
39 It is worth mentioning here that in connection with its codification of a good deal of the 10b-5 
jurisprudence, sec 1603(b) of the Federal Securities Code defines “insider” in a manner thought to 
represent existing case law: 
For purposes of section 1603, “insider” means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person 
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer, (3) a person who, by virtue of his 
relationship or former relationship to the issuer, knows a material fact about the issuer or the security in 
question that is not generally available, or (4) a person who learns such a fact from a person within 
section 1603(b) (including a person within section 1603(b)(4)) with knowledge that the person from 
whom he learns the fact is such a person, unless the Commission or a court finds that it would be 
inequitable, on consideration of the circumstances and the purposes of this Code (including the 
deterrent effect of liability), to treat the person within section 1603(b)(4) as if he were within section 
1603(b)(1), (2), or (3). (Loss, above n 9, 830.) 
40 Szockyj, above n 6, 53. 
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the flexibility of this regime has resulted in complex — and sometimes controversial — 
decisions in this field. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that the SEC, among other things, has 
achieved a greater degree of success in at least being seen to combat insider abuse than 
anyone else. In this sense, it has been argued, “while many abroad regard the absence of an 
SEC-equivalent as something of a blessing, there is little doubt that the credibility of the 
statement that a particular country regulates insider trading requires something more than a 
look at statute books to assess.”41 
 
THE DEFINITION OF “INSIDER” IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARISON 
 
The US is not the only nation to address the issue of insider trading. Insider trading regulation 
is also common outside the US; more than one hundred countries now have insider-trading 
prohibitions. Most have followed the US in applying criminal sanctions in cases where mens rea 
can be proven. New Zealand currently stands out as one of the few jurisdictions where insider 
trading is not a criminal offence, though this has been suggested as an area of possible future 
reform.42 
 
As mentioned above, there are two approaches to the defining of “insider”: the “person 
connection” and “information connection” approaches. The former defines an insider as 
someone who has a relationship (direct or indirect) with the issuer of the securities. Under this 
approach, insider trading is considered inconsistent with a fiduciary or similar duty owed to the 
entity whose securities are traded or which is the owner of the inside information. The person 
connection approach can be divided into three categories: the direct connection, employment, 
and fiduciary duty approaches.43 In contrast, under the information connection approach any 
one who has material price-sensitive information that is not generally available is considered an 
insider, regardless of their relationship to the source of the information. It is considered that 
trading with knowledge while in possession of information, rather than a person’s connection, is 
what can detrimentally affect the market.44 
 
Australia 
 
The definition of “insider” contained in sec 1043A(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 is 
significantly different to that contained in previous insider trading legislation in that country. The 
previous provisions defined an insider by reference to that person’s connection with a body 
corporate. However, the Griffiths Committee report of 1989, Fair Shares for All: Insider Trading 
in Australia, described this aspect of the previous legislation as an unnecessary complication. It 
argued that the basis for determining whether insider trading had occurred should be the use of 
                                                 
41 Cox, Hillman and Langevoort, above n 36, 1004. 
42 See Insider Trading: Discussion Document, Ministry of Economic Development (September 2000) [7.1]-[7.17]. 
43 See above n 5, [110]-[113]. 
44 Ibid [120]-[122]. 
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information, rather than the connection between a person and a body corporate. 45 Australia 
subsequently adopted the information connection approach without any person connection. 
Section 1043A(1) provides that insider trading occurs if: 
 
(a) a person (the “insider”) possesses inside information; and 
(b) the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “inside information” in sec 1042A are 
satisfied … 
 
The matters specified in those paragraphs are: 
 
(a) the information is not generally available; and 
(b) if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it 
to have a material effect on the price or value of particular … financial products. 
 
In Australia, an insider is thus any person who possesses inside information and who knows or 
reasonably ought to know that the information is inside information. Thus, if a person merely 
overhears a conversation in a lift or on the street they can be regarded as an insider even 
though they do not have any connection with the issuer of the securities. It is clear that the 
Australian regime has created a broader net of potential defendants to cover anyone who has 
confidential price sensitive information. 
 
United Kingdom46 
 
The original UK legislation on insider dealing was contained in Part V of the Companies Act 
1980 and was later consolidated in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. In order 
to adopt the European Community Directive 89/592 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, 
Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (hereinafter the CJA) was introduced. 
 
Under the CJA, perhaps the most significant change is the abandonment of the traditional 
requirement that the insider be “knowingly connected” with the company to which the inside 
information relates. Under the previous law, the concept of “primary insiders” was defined by 
reference to a “connection” with a company. By contrast, the CJA does not require such a 
nexus. Under sec 57(1) of the CJA, a person will have information as an insider if, and only if: 
 
(a) the information is, and he knows that it is, inside information; and 
(b) he has the information, and knows that he has it, from an inside source. 
                                                 
45 Phillip Lipton and Abe Herzberg, Understanding Company Law (10th ed, 2001) 535. 
46 With respect to the definition of insider, South African law is almost identical to that of the UK. See 
Richard Jooste, ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa — Another Attempt’ (2000) 17 South 
African Law Journal  283, 286-290. 
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Obviously, under the CJA, it is sufficient that an insider has access to the information by virtue 
of his employment, office, or profession. This represents a significant extension of the law to 
catch improper conduct by persons who are not “connected” with a company but nevertheless 
have direct access to price-sensitive information about it. 
 
It is worth noting that the UK does not have a “pure” information connection approach. Under 
sec 57(2) of the CJA, three categories of insider can be identified: true insiders, temporary 
insiders and tippees.47 Under the previous law, they were regarded as “connected persons” 
and had a “connection” with the issuer of the securities. Generally speaking, inside information 
comes from an inside source. So in practice, there is a need to define the exact scope of “an 
inside source”. Under the CJA, as an additional definition of “insider”, sec 57(2) is used to 
explain what comprises “an inside source” and to some extent this makes the definition of 
“insider” a little clearer, although its test is still not entirely clear. 48 On the other hand, sec 57(2) 
imposes a requirement of mens rea for criminal liability under the CJA. That is, the accused 
must be proved to have known that the information came from “an inside source”, ie. that he or 
she fell within one or other of the three categories of “connected persons”. 49 In this sense, 
although it has been submitted that sec 57(2) is no longer necessary since a simple access test 
will determine whether or not such individuals have information as insiders,50 at least as far as 
the definition of insider is concerned, the partial application of the person connection approach 
further clarifies who is an insider and is useful to improve certainty in the definition. 
 
Singapore 
 
The previous provision that dealt directly with insider trading in Singapore was sec 103 of the 
Securities Industry Act (hereinafter the SIA). Under the SIA, a person connection approach was 
used. Compared to other jurisdictions, perhaps the most striking feature of the old Singapore 
insider trading law was that its scope covered almost all potential insiders provided for in other 
jurisdictions.51 
                                                 
47 Section 57(2) of the CJA provides that a person has information form an inside source if and only if: (a) 
he has the information through being a director, employee or s hareholder of an issue of securities or has 
access to the information by virtue of his employment, office or profession; or (b) the direct or indirect 
source of his information is a person with paragraph (a). 
48 See Paul L. Davies, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (6th ed, 1997) 465-466. 
49 Davies has argued that sometimes the requirement that inside information must come from an “inside 
source” is likely to be difficult to meet, and in circumstances such as the accused being a director, the 
fact will presumably raise “a pretty strong prima facie case” that the accused knew that fact, and so 
move the evidential burden to the director to disprove knowledge. (Emphasis added) (Ibid 467). By way 
of comparison, see the approach taken in Singapore’s insider trading laws discussed below. 
50 Ashe and Counsell, above n 7, 91. 
51 For example, natural persons who could be potential corporate insiders under the SIA were: 
(1) a director, secretary, executive officer or employee of the body corporate; 
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Section 103 of the SIA was based on sec 128 of the Australian Securities Industry Act 1980.52 
Since the Australian insider trading laws were completely redrafted in 1991 in order to 
overcome the shortcomings of its previous provisions, the Securities and Futures Act 2001 
(hereinafter the SFA) was passed in Singapore on 5 October 2001 to follow the current 
Australian model in adopting an information connection approach. 
 
Under the SFA, an insider is anyone in possession of inside information. The SFA divides 
insiders into two groups and contains two provisions on insider liability: sec 218 deals with 
insider trading by connected persons53 and sec 219 deals with persons other than connected 
persons. No provision on connected persons appears in the current Australian legislation, but 
this deviation does not mean that the person connection approach has been retained in the 
insider trading laws in Singapore. 54 Instead, the underlying philosophy behind sec 218 is the 
same as the Australian provision. That is to say, a person who has an informational advantage 
over another should be prohibited from taking such an advantage, regardless of how such an 
advantage came about. In this respect, there should not be any distinction between connected 
persons and other persons. Although the SFA does contain a specific provision on connected 
persons, in effect the person connection approach has been done away with by sec 219 so as 
to widen the previous prohibition. 
 
It is noteworthy that sec 218 contains a presumption of mens rea against connected persons, 
resulting in the reversal of the onus of proof upon the defendant with respect to the existence of 
the mental element.55 It is therefore submitted that the difference between sec 218 and sec 219 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) a receiver, or receiver and manager, of property of the body corporate; 
(3) an official manager or a deputy official manager of the body corporate; 
(4) a liquidator of the body corporate; 
(5) a trustee or other person administering a compromise or arrangement made between the body 
corporate and another person or other persons; 
(6) an officer of a related body corporate; 
(7) a substantial shareholder or an officer of such substantial share holder, within the meaning of 
Division 4 of Part IV of the Companies Act in that body corporate or in a related body corporate; 
(8) a professional or business associate of the body corporate or a related body corporate occupying a 
position that may reasonably be expected to give him access to price sensitive information or 
information otherwise not generally available. (Hairani Saban, Corporate Debt Securitization – 
Regulation and Documentation (1994) 31.) 
52 Mark Stamp and Carson Welsh (eds.) International Insider Dealing (1996) 416. 
53 Under sec 218, a connected person includes an officer, a substantial shareholder or a person who 
occupies a position that may reasonably be expected to give him access to price sensitive information. 
Hence the connected persons listed in sec 218 are identical to those referred to in the SIA. 
54 Chiu Hse Yu, ‘Australian Influences on the Insider Trading Laws in Singapore’ [2002] Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 574, 577. 
55 Ibid. 
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is the mode of proof. In order to establish insider liability, sec 218 reverses the onus of proof to 
ease the difficulties of proof both in terms of evidence gathering and the burden of proof.56 This 
approach seems better than the UK model (see above). 
 
Japan 
 
The principal prohibition in Japan against insider trading is set out in a 1988 amendment to the 
Securities and Exchange Law of Japan (hereinafter the SEL). Articles 166 and 167 of the SEL 
set out two different definitions of insider: Company insiders, and related persons in a tender 
offer. The persons subject to the prohibition are: 
 
(1) officers, agents, employees of the issuer and its parent corporation and subsidiary 
corporations (the “issuer, etc.”); 
(2) the holders of 3% or more of the shares of the issuer, etc.; 
(3) if such shareholder is a corporation, its officers, agents and employees 
(4) any person who has a statutory power to investigate the issuer, etc. (such as 
government officials who have the statutory power to investigate the issuer, etc.); and 
(5) any person who has entered into an agreement with the issuer, etc., and if such person 
is a corporation, its officers, agents and employees.57 
 
When such persons obtain their knowledge in connection with the performance of their duties, 
with the exercise of their power, or with the entering into or performing of the contract, they are 
regarded as insiders. Clearly, Japan adopts a person connection approach to define who is an 
insider.  
 
Hong Kong 
 
In Hong Kong, insider dealing is regulated under the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance 
(hereinafter the SIDO). Section 9 of the SIDO sets out the circumstances under which insider 
dealing will be found to have occurred. According to this section, the SIDO identifies four 
categories of “insider”: persons contemplating takeovers; persons connected with a corporation; 
persons who receive relevant information from a connected person and who knowingly use it to 
deal in securities or who counsel others to do so; and “tippees” of each of the above. A person 
who is “connected with a corporation” includes, among others, directors, officers and 
employees of a corporation. It is worth noting here that in ss 10-12 of the SIDO, some statutory 
exceptions are set out to permit dealing where insiders have not exploited their access to 
information. Of them, sec 10 is the most important provision, which lists “certain persons not to 
be held insider dealers”.58 
                                                 
56 Ibid 579. 
57 SEL, art 166, para. 1. 
58 Section 10 of the SIDO reads: “Certain persons not to be held insider dealers: 
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China 
 
The definition of insider is set out in article 68 of the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of 
China 1998. Like many countries, China adopts the person connection approach to define 
insider. One thing worth mentioning is that subject to article 68(7), “other persons specified by 
the State Council’s Securities Regulatory Authority” may be regarded as insiders. This provision 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) A person who enters into a transaction which is an insider dealing shall not be held to be an insider 
dealer if he establishes that he entered into the transaction — 
(a) for the sole purpose of the acquisition of qualification shares required by him as a director or 
intending director of any corporation; 
(b) in the bona fide performance of an underwriting agreement with respect to the securities to which 
the transaction relates; or 
(c) in the bona fide exercise of his functions as a liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy.  
(2) A corporation which enters into a transaction which is an insider dealing shall not be held to be an 
insider dealer if, although relevant information concerning the corporation whose securities are the 
subject of the insider dealing is in the possession of a director or employee of the first corporation it 
establishes that — 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction was taken on its behalf by a person other than that 
director or employee; and 
(b) arrangements were then in existence for securing that the information was not communicated to 
that person and that no advice with respect to the transaction was given to him by a person in 
possession of the information; and 
(c) the information was not in fact so communicated and advice was not in fact so given. 
(3) A person who enters into a transaction which is an insider dealing shall not be held to be an insider 
dealer if he establishes that he entered into the transaction otherwise than with a view to the making of 
a profit or the avoiding of a loss (whether for himself or another) by the use of relevant information. 
(4) A person who, as agent for another, enters into a transaction which is an insider dealing shall not be 
held to be an insider dealer if he establishes that he entered into the transaction as agent for another 
person and he did not select or advise on the selection of the securities to which the transaction relates. 
(5) A person who enters into a transaction which is an insider dealing shall not be held to be an insider 
dealer if he establishes — 
(a) that the other party to the transaction knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the relevant 
information in question before entering into the transaction; and 
(b) that the transaction was neither recorded on the Unified Exchange nor required to be notified to 
the Unified Exchange under its rules. 
(6) A person who enters into a transaction which is an insider dealing in relation to a listed corporation 
shall not be held to be an insider dealer, other than as a person who has couns eled or procured another 
person to deal in listed securities or their derivatives, if he establishes that the other party to the 
transaction knew or ought reasonably to have known that he was a person connected with that 
corporation. 
(7) A person who enters into a transaction which is an insider dealing shall not be held to be an insider 
dealer if he establishes that the transaction is a market contract within the meaning of section 2 of the 
Securities and Futures (Clearing Houses) Ordinance (Cap 420)”. 
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leaves in the hands of the government agency the ability to define those persons it believes to 
be insiders and greatly increases the flexibility of the definition of insider. Unlike the SEC in the 
US, the government agency can employ its power without judicial review, which is unique in the 
world. 
 
Critique 
 
In summary, there are two approaches to the question of who an insider is: Australia, the UK 
and Singapore adopt the information connection approach; Japan, Hong Kong and China still 
adopt the person connection approach. Which approach is better to define “insider”? 
Unquestionably, both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages.  
 
Under the person connection approach it is, in theory, easier to identify a person who falls 
within one of the categories provided by the law; however, in practice difficulties have arisen in 
the use of the person connection criteria. Those regimes that employ this approach have to list 
as many potential insiders as they possibly can. The resulting definitions have become long 
and complex, such as that used in Japan. Even with a comprehensive list, the person 
connection criteria may still leave gaps in coverage. A good example is the old insider trading 
laws in Singapore, where not all people who traded on inside information could be covered by 
the definition of insider, even though that definition was very comprehensive. 59 
 
Some might suggest that the regulation of article 68(7) of the Securities Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 1998 would, to some extent, overcome the above problems. However, such 
a regulation leaves too much power in the hands of the state agency, and it is too imprecise for 
the regulated to order their own behaviour. It is clear that this is inconsistent with the rule of law. 
An alternative might be to adopt a regime based on common law. 60 In the US, any outsiders 
who trade on nonpublic information could be caught by the misappropriation theory, where the 
definition of insider is, in practice, similar to that in Australia. However, as discussed above, the 
American approach requires a fiduciary link between the insider and the source of information. 
To some extent, that has res ulted in difficulties in catching some persons who trade on inside 
information even though the American government, in particular the SEC, has endeavoured to 
widen the scope of insiders to catch as many as they can. In addition, the common problem of 
adopting a regime based on common law is that the flexibility of those regimes reduces 
certainty in this field. The US laws have therefore been questioned as to whether they are as 
effective and efficient as is often maintained. 61  
 
                                                 
59 See Yang Ing Loong, Andy Yeo and Sharon Lee, Insider Trading: New Wine in Old Wineskins? 
http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2001-9/Sep01-focus3.htm. 
60 Semaan, Freeman and Adams, above n 31, 230. 
61 Charles Rickett and Ross Grantham (eds.) Essays on Insider Trading and Securities Regulation  (1997) 
142-143. 
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Under the information connection approach, the definition of insider is not as important as it is 
under the person connection approach: Under the person connection approach, “insider” and 
“inside information” are both core definitions of regulating insider trading; however, since the 
information connection approach defines insiders as anyone who has inside information, only 
“inside information” is of prime importance. 62 In this sense, it seems that the test for the 
definition of “insider” has been simplified. To some extent, we can say there is no need to 
define “insider” under the information connection approach. On the other hand, the information 
connection approach has created a wider scope of insiders than before. Under this approach, 
anyone in possession of inside information may attract liability, thus creating the potential for 
innocent persons to find themselves in a very technical breach of the law. Clearly there is a 
need to reduce uncertainty when introducing an information connection approach; otherwise, 
this approach may have the undesirable result of sanctioning insider trading, but also 
potentially stifling innovative research and analysis of matters impacting on company and 
market performance by preventing analysts from identifying mis-priced securities and trading 
on those securities accordingly. This creates a risk that the price may not reflect the fair value 
and market efficiency may be damaged.63  
 
It should be stressed here that although the advent of the information connection approach 
greatly simplifies the definition of insider, there is a danger of overstating the case. In Australia, 
the central recommendation of the Griffiths Committee was that the person connection 
approach should be removed, principally in the interests of simplicity. However, the 1991 insider 
trading reforms did not take up the principal recommendation. In contrast, the new insider 
trading provisions in Australia are at least four times as long (and in many respects far more 
complex than) the provisions they replaced. 64  Just as was the case under the person 
connection approach, the 1991 reforms still included a range of exceptions and exemptions as 
part of the insider trading provisions now found in Div 3 of Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act 
2001.65 In its response to the Griffiths Committee’s report, the government argued that: 
 
Simplicity in the language of statutes is certainly the aim but when it is inconsistent 
with certainty, certainty has usually been preferred. The tension between simplicity 
                                                 
62 In this sense, it has been submitted that the expression “insider trading” is not strictly correct. It is more 
accurate to describe the provisions as dealing with the “misuse of non-public information”: Lipton and 
Herzberg, above n 45, 535. 
63 Above n 5, [124]. 
64 Roman Tomasic, James Jackson and Robin Woellner, Corporations Law: Principles, Policy and Process 
(4th ed, 2002) 998. 
65 Simply speaking, there are eight broad categories of exceptions and exemptions provided in the 1991 
reforms: 1. trustees; 2. underwriters; 3. effect of legal requirements; 4. Chinese walls; 5. knowledge of 
own intentions; 6. knowledge of proposed or previous transactions; 7. dealers and dealers’ 
representatives; 8. where information was generally available or known to the other party. (For more 
detail discussion, see Tomasic, Jackson and Woellner, ibid 1008-1009.) 
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and certainty in drafting is exacerbated when the subject matter is itself complex.66 
 
Interestingly, a similar approach has been adopted in the UK, where the information connection 
approach includes a person connection in order to further clarify the definition of insider. Davies 
discusses this approach as follows: 
 
It might be thought that nothing more needs to be said other than that an insider is a 
person in possession of inside information. In other words, the definitional burden in 
the legislation should fall on deciding what is inside information and the definition of 
insider should follow as a secondary consequence of this primary definition. The 
Government’s consultative document on the proposed legislation rejected this 
approach as likely to cause “damaging uncertainty in the markets, as individuals 
attempted to identify whether or not they were covered”. This is not convincing. Either 
the definition of inside information is adequate or it ought to be reformed. If it is 
adequate, so that it can be applied effectively to those who are insiders under the Act, 
then it is not clear why it cannot be applied to all individuals, whether they meet the 
separate criteria for being insiders or not. If the definition of inside information is not 
adequate, it is not proper to apply it even to those who clearly are insiders under the 
legislation and it should be changed. In fact, the proposal that insiders should be 
defined as those in possession of inside information would to some extent reduce 
uncertainty, because the only question which would have to be asked is whether the 
individual was in possession of inside information and the additional question of 
whether the individual met the separate criteria for being classed as an insider would 
be irrelevant.67 
 
Unfortunately, the definition of inside information is not adequate. Partly this is because the 
concept of inside information itself is not clear; partly it may be because the law may not be 
capable of making it clear. In fact, the definitions of “insider” and “inside information” are 
interlaced, and to some extent they reinforce each other. An insider is one who possesses 
inside information; likewise, in most cases, if not all, it is sufficient to infer inside information 
from an inside source. In this sense, it seems that to identify who is an insider, neither the 
person connection only approach nor the information connection only approach is the best 
option.  
 
As noted above, there is a trend to broaden the scope of insiders. With the globalisation of 
securities markets and the advent of Internet securities trading, this issue will become more 
and more complex. In order to simplify the provision and reduce uncertainty, the better way 
may be to base the definition of “insider” on the information connection approach but include a 
person connection (as in the UK and Singapore models). Compared to the information 
                                                 
66 Ibid 998. 
67 Davies, above n 48, 464-465. 
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connection only approach, this approach needs to achieve two functions: First, by way of listing 
connected persons, this approach should further clarify the definition of insider and meet the 
practical need of connected persons to identify whether or not they fall within the scope of 
insiders. In this sense, any unclear or “gray” area in the definition of insiders should be 
excluded from the connected persons list, to make it clear and reduce uncertainty. Secondly, it 
is difficult to prove the mens rea elements of insider trading when prosecuting connected 
persons as they are in a privileged position to destroy evidence of any improper market 
behavior. 68 In order to establish liability of connected persons effectively, this approach may be 
used to introduce a presumption that reverses the onus of proof. It seems that the UK and 
Singapore models, to different extents, have been used to achieve these two functions. 
However, the UK model does not have such a clear regulation on connected persons as the 
Singapore model, and more importantly, there is no explicit presumption of mens rea in the UK, 
which is quite different from the presumption for connected persons in Singapore’s insider 
trading laws. On balance, the Singapore model seems preferable. 
 
It is worth mentioning that to avoid throwing too wide a net on the scope of the prohibition, it is 
common practice to include to a range of exceptions in the insider trading law, even under the 
person connection approach. Put another way, to protect market confidence, the net should be 
cast wide enough to catch anyone who trades on inside information on one hand; and to 
protect the public interest, the net should not be cast so wide to catch legitimate market 
activities. A good approach will achieve a balance between them. So the question here is not 
whether there is a need to provide exemptions, but how to provide exemptions. It has been 
submitted that the simplicity of the information connection approach has been undermined by a 
large number of generous exceptions and exemptions that the 1991 Australian reforms not only 
preserve, but also extend. 69 It is necessary to work out what exemptions should (and should 
not) be included as part of the insider trading provisions.70 
  
THE DEFINITION OF “INSIDER” IN NEW ZEALAND: A REVIEW 
 
In New Zealand, the definition of “insider” contained within sec 3(1) of the Securities Markets 
Act 1988 reads as follows: 
 
For the purpose of Part I of this Act, “insider” in relation to a public issuer, means— 
(a) The public issuer; 
                                                 
68 Yu, above n 54, 579. 
69 Tomasic, Jackson and Woellner, above n 64, 999. 
70 Generally speaking, there are different ways to provide exemptions even though the content of 
exemptions provided by most countries are similar. We are of the view that when providing exemptions, 
it would be better to list exceptions such as sec 10 of the SIDO (HK) to improve the clarity of exemptions. 
However, a discussion on this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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(b) A person who, by reason of being a principal officer, or an employee, or company 
secretary of, or a substantial security holder in, the public issuer, has insider 
information about the public issuer or another public issuer; 
(c) A person who receives inside information in confidence from a person described 
in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this subsection about the public issuer or 
another public issuer; 
(d) A person who, by reason of being a principal officer, or an employee, or company 
secretary of, or a substantial security holder in, a person described in paragraph 
(c) of this subsection, has that inside information; 
(e) A person who receives inside information in confidence from a person described 
in paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) of this subsection about the public issuer or 
another public issuer; 
(f) A person who, by reason of being a principal officer, or an employee, or company 
secretary of, or a substantial security holder in, a person described in paragraph 
(e) of this subsection has that inside information. 
 
Obviously, the Securities Markets Act 1988 adopts a person connection approach. Under that 
Act, there are two kinds of insider. One is the public issuer. The other is the individual. When 
referring to the individual, there are two ways a person can be an insider. The first is where a 
person has a relationship with the public issuer (as a principal officer, employee or substantial 
security holder) and possesses the inside information. The second is where a person receives 
the inside information in confidence from an insider. 71  
 
Several difficulties have been raised in the interpretation and application of the Securities 
Markets Act 1988 definition of “insider”. 72 There are four arguments put forward in the Ministry 
of Economic Development’s 2000 discussion paper on insider trading, suggesting a lack of 
clarity in the definition of “insider” and the circumstances in which an insider is liable for trading: 
 
3.4 It has been argued that the present definition of insider is too broad in some 
instances, and accordingly, may lead to outcomes that are not intended. For 
instance, at present the law applies to transactions between informed parties. In 
an instance where both parties are informed and aware of the confidential 
information, there is arguably no detriment to either party. 
3.5 It has also been argued that the present definition is too narrow in some instances. 
For example, the current definition applies to a person who has received inside 
information in confidence from an officer of the public issuer. However, it is 
unclear as to whether the Securities [Markets] Act applies in a situation where the 
person has obtained illegal access to the officer’s records. 
                                                 
71 See Gordon Walker et al (eds.) Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (2nd ed, 1998) 611-
612. 
72 Insider Trading: Discussion Document, Ministry of Economic Development (September 2000) [3.2]. 
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3.6 The issue is also sometimes raised that the Securities [Markets] Act is impractical 
in its application to situations involving due diligence. For example, an institutional 
investor may gain inside information about a public issuer in the course of acting 
as an underwriter in the raising of new capital.  
3.7 Liability for tipping in the Securities [Markets] Act raises a further potential issue. 
At present, the law applies to make an insider who is a tipper liable for the trading 
of a tippee. Questions have been raised about whether the tipper needs to be 
aware that the information is inside information, and, if not, whether liability is 
appropriate in those circumstances.73 
 
Does the present definition of “insider” lack clarity? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
consider what the rationale for the present definition is. 
 
As mentioned above, under the person connection approach, the application of the prohibition 
on insider trading is linked to the fiduciary duty or misappropriation rationales. Accordingly, the 
rationale for a person to be regarded as an insider lies in the following grounds: It is easy to 
understand that a person who possesses inside information is probably an insider. But merely 
possessing inside information does not mean that the person is an insider, if he does not 
receive the inside information in confidenc e. Bearing this in mind, we discuss the four 
arguments as follows. 
 
The first argument “that the present definition of insider is too broad in some instances”  
 
As noted above, in the US, an insider is not liable for his insider trading unless a profit is gained 
or loss avoided. That is, under the US regime, the intention of gaining profit or avoiding loss 
constitutes an element of the definition of “insider”. Thus, in terms of the Ministry of Economic 
Development’s first argument, since there is no detriment to either party, the traders would not 
be liable for insider trading. However, the Securities Markets Act 1988 does not have this 
requirement, so those people who are informed and aware of the confidential information would 
fall within the definition of insider. In this sense, we agree with the first argument that the 
present definition is too broad in some instances. 
 
The second argument “that the present definition is too narrow in some instances”  
 
The person connection approach reflects the fiduciary duty or misappropriation rationales in the 
New Zealand regime. In this respect, the Securities Commission’s report that preceded the 
enactment of the Securities Markets Act 1988 states that the core concept behind the insider 
trading provisions is the prevention of profit taking in situations where information in relation to 
the value of securities is held in confidence. 74 Receipt of inside information in confidence is the 
                                                 
73 Ibid [3.4]-[3.7]. 
74 Adrian van Schie, Insider Trading, Nominee Disclosure and Futures Dealing: an Analysis of the 
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first important element in understanding the definition of “insider”. 
 
The requirement of “confidential relationship”, however, has resulted in difficulties in catching 
someone who trades on inside information without “confidential relationship”. Under the present 
definition, i f there is no “confidential relationship” between the person who receives inside 
information and the person who has the source of the inside information, the receiver 
presumably has no liability to keep the information secret, and his trading on that information 
will not constitute insider trading. As van Schie states: “It seems that someone who obtains the 
relevant information by theft is not an insider, nor is someone who purchases information on a 
non-confidential basis from an insider.”75 Such a result seems to be at odds with the policy of 
the prohibition on insider trading. 
 
The third argument “that the Securities Markets Act 1988 is impractical in its application 
to situations involving due diligence” 
 
Whether information has been received in confidence by a person should be treated as a 
question of fact taking into account the circumstances and terms of communication. 76 In this 
sense, if in a conference or other commercial activities, either party promises, either implicitly or 
explicitly, to keep the information secret from other parties, even if a contact never eventuates 
between them, there still lies a “confidential relationship” between them. As Lord Goff 
expressed the principles in the case of Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2): “ a 
duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person in 
circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is 
confidential, with the effect that it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be 
precluded from disclosing the information to others.” 77 Accordingly, we disagree with the 
assertion that the Securities Markets Act 1988 is impractical in situations involving due 
diligence. In such situations, the institutional investor should have notice or have been held to 
agree that the information is confidential, and he should therefore be required to keep it 
confidential. Otherwise, the investor should be liable for any insider trading that occurs.  
 
The fourth argument on liability for tipping in the Securities Markets Act 1988 
 
As for liability for tipping, there are two points to be stressed here: First, according to the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Wilson Neill Ltd,78 absence 
of moral fault has no bearing on liability under sec 7 or 9. An insider will be liable for tipping 
under sec 9 irrespective of whether or not the insider realises he or she possessed the inside 
                                                                                                                                                             
Securities Amendment Act 1988 (1994) 15. 
75 Ibid 13. 
76 Walker et al, above n 71, 614. 
77 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281. 
78 [1994] 2 NZLR 152 (CA). 
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information or the significance of the information. 79 Secondly, it is not necessary to show 
causation between the tipping and the ultimate decision to buy or sell.80  
 
The fourth argument suggests, “questions have been raised about whether the tipper needs to 
be aware that the information is inside information, and, if not, whether liability is appropriate in 
those circumstances”. In Wilson Neill, the Court of Appeal held, “The test is not subjective 
knowledge, but the objective possession of information. Otherwise the purpose of the 
legislation could be thwarted by difficulties of proof.”81 It is clear that the tipper does not need to 
be aware that the information is inside information. In the circumstance that the insider is not 
aware that the information is non-public and is likely to affect materially the share price, if the 
victim suffers a loss when trading with the tippee, the insider might be liable under s 9(2). It is 
presumably because the insider, whether he is conscious the information is inside information 
or not, has a confidential relationship with the source of the information, that he has the 
responsibility to keep it secret. Once he tips the information to the tippee, his action is a breach 
of his duty. So, he should be liable for the loss of the person who trades with the tippee. 
 
From the above analysis, it seems that the definition of insider in the Securities Markets Act 
1988 is clear on the whole. However, clarity is not always sufficient. Under the person 
connection approach, the Securities Markets Act 1988 faces the same problems as that of 
other overseas regimes: the definition of “insider” in sec 3 is long and complex. It has been 
argued that the policy underlying the Securities Markets Act 1988 is less concerned with fraud 
on the market and more concerned with abuse of a relationship that imports an obligation of 
confidence.82 Under this policy, the scope of the insider trading prohibitions has been greatly 
limited. This has been illustrated by the trading in the shares of Fletcher Challenge Ltd in May 
1999, where the subjects of the investigation were not considered insiders under the Act, as 
they were both too many steps removed from the source of the information. 83 
 
When reviewing the New Zealand definition of insider, a suitable consideration should be given 
to the suggestions from the 1991 reforms in Australia: 
 
3.3.5 Insider trading legislation should not be based on any theory which may limit 
the scope of the prohibition, either by some concept of fiduciary duty or a theory of 
misappropriation. 
                                                 
79 Walker et al, above n 71, 617. 
80 Van Schie, above n 74, 24. 
81 Above n 78 at 161 (Emphasis added). 
82 Frank McLaughlin and Roger Wallis, Securities Markets Update, New Zealand Law Society seminar 
(October 2002) 39-40. 
83 Insider Trading Law and Practice: Report on Questions arising from an Inquiry into Trading in the Shares 
of Fletcher Challenge Limited in May 1999, New Zealand Securities Commission (2000). 
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3.3.6 Rather, it must be emphasized that the basis for regulating insider trading is the 
need to guarantee investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets.84 
 
Similarly, the experience drawn from the American practice is that to tackle insider trading 
effectively, as noted above, the definition of insider has been broadened and the underlying 
policy has been shifted to the rationales of market fairness and efficiency. In this sense, if it 
could be argued that the New Zealand law also needs to focus on preserving the integrity of 
securities market, it seems clear that it is necessary to adopt a broader definition of insider and 
conduct such as that which happened in the share trading of Fletcher Challenge Ltd should not 
be excluded from the scope of the prohibitions. However, the current New Zealand law has 
adopted a more narrow, relationship-based, approach, which does not capture some conduct 
that could be thought of as damaging to the integrity of the market. 
 
In response to the problems arising from the application of insider trading law, the Securities 
Markets Amendment Act 2002 has been passed as an important step towards reorganising 
securities markets law, which makes the Securities Markets Act 1988 a separate statute in its 
own right and as such emphasises the importance of this evolving area of law.85 Under the 
Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002, greater powers have been given to the Securities 
Commission as an enforcement body. Correspondingly, the government has granted greater 
funding to the Securities Commission. Although the role of the Securities Commission is not as 
significant as that of the SEC in American, arguably the Securities Commission will play an 
important role in combating insider trading, which may, to some extent, overcome the limitation 
of the definition of insider. However, if we consider the problems contained in the Securities 
Markets Act 1988 in a systematic manner, 86 it is no doubt necessary to review the definition of 
insider, and as discussed above, the better way may be to adopt an information connection 
approach when formulating a definition of insider.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
No definition is perfect. If a definition can be used to resolve most problems in practice, it can 
be considered to be successful. In this sense, the definition of “insider” in sec 3 of the 
Securities Markets Act 1988 may be regarded as a good definition. However, with the evolution 
of insider trading, the definition of “insider” has become long and complex. Even so, there is still 
some conduct which is excluded from the scope of the Securities Markets Act 1988. In order to 
simplify the definition and reduce uncertainty, there may be two choices in identifying who is an 
                                                 
84 Fair Shares for All: Insider Trading in Australia Report of the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, AGDS (1989). 
85 McLaughlin and Wallis, above n 82, 2. 
86 It has been submitted that the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002 falls into the trap of failing to 
address reforms in a systematic manner. (McLaughlin and Wallis, ibid) 
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insider: one is to adopt the information connection only approach; the other is to adopt the 
information connection approach but include a person connection. On balance, we would prefer 
the latter approach, along the lines of the Singapore model. 
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